"Neuroscience and Philosophy" begins with an excerpt from "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience," in which Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker question the ...

It is the peculiar impasses of contemporary philosophy that send Lugarini back to Aristotle; the ultimate purpose guiding his work is to bring to light, by means of imaginative scholarship, the roots of the whole project of philosophizing. In developing a thoroughgoing view of Aristotle, the author consciously, though unobtrusively, aims at today's central philosophical problems. He criticizes traditional Aristotelianism and claims that the "idea of philosophy" for Aristotle was founded not so much upon the presupposition of substance as upon (...) man's vocation to find order in all phenomena. This vocation is revealed in the fundamental orexis, or wonder, that is man's defining characteristic. Lugarini is clear and painstaking; and whether the overall approach is accepted or not, his exhaustive examinations of key terms are valuable for every student of Aristotle. A major text on Aristotle. --C. D. (shrink)

As Gelven points out in his Preface, this is the only section-by-section commentary on the full text of Being and Time. Being and Time is divided not only into two "divisions" of six chapters each but also into eighty-three numbered "sections". As such it provides an efficient and useful handbook for those who try to make their way through the rugged terrain of Heidegger's text, especially for the beginner. Gelven's prose is crisp and clean and uncluttered by Germanicisms. He often (...) uses uncomplicated and helpful illustrations. The interpretation stresses the importance of the analysis of "understanding" taking § 31 as "the key to Being and Time". In fact, Gelven groups §§ 25-38 as a whole under the single heading "Understanding". Such an emphasis seems entirely legitimate. He treats the historical sources of Being and Time but often leaves them undeveloped. He is content, for example, to devote a single paragraph to Dilthey whose influence upon Heidegger is so decisive, with the comment that not much is ever said about Dilthey in English philosophical literature. One also finds it a bit hard to swallow the author's argument that "Dasein" means literally "to be here" and, in sentence form: "Here I am, open to possibilities". In all, however, Gelven's work is a distinctive contribution and not a mere reworking of already familiar themes.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s work Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing, signed in his own name, was meant as a private preparation for public confession. To be pure of heart meant to have a single-minded dedication to the will of God, a dedication from which all other foreign motives had been filtered out. A pure heart does good not out of fear of punishment or the hope of a reward but solely because it is God’s will. There is thus a Kantian (...) rigorism in this work: every overt or concealed form of self-love must be purged in order that an act be truly moral. Jeremy Walker, who has also written a book on Frege, and whose book reads faintly like a work in analytic ethics, has written not an exhaustive commentary on Purity of Heart but a set of "reflections" on some philosophical themes that run through the work. He takes up the question of Kierkegaard’s Kantian conception of morality and argues that the dynamic of Kierkegaard’s notion of ethical choice leads straight to an absolute commitment to the absolute good, God. Thus purity of heart is only possible if the will is directed towards an absolute good. Kierkegaard’s true view is a Christian synthesis of Kant and Plato. It also follows that the opposition of the ethical and the religious is false. Such a view, which belongs to the doctrine of the three stages, is not Kierkegaard’s but that of the pseudonymous authors. It is actually opposed to the view that Kierkegaard signs in his own name. Walker’s book is brief, clear and addressed to an important point, not only for Kierkegaardian scholarship, but also for ethics.—J.D.C. (shrink)

This work is an invaluable aid to Heidegger scholars. It brings the bibliography of Heidegger to completion through 1967. The work begins with a presentation of the writings of Heidegger in chronological order. Next the author lists all the translations of Heidegger's works, following the order in which those works were presented in the previous section. It is interesting to note that there are no less than four translations of Sein und Zeit in Japanese. The literature on Heidegger comes next. (...) It is presented year by year, with the authors within a single year listed alphabetically. This section includes both books and articles. A spot check reveals inevitable omissions and mistakes. No entry occurs for the partial translation of Vom Wesen des Grundes in The Search for Being, trans. and ed. by J. Wilde and W. Kimmel, pp. 507-520. The fascinating fact that Gilbert Ryle reviewed Sein und Zeit in Mind, 38, pp. 355-370) is obscured by referring to "Ryle, E." in both the entry and the index. This is unfortunate because of the many favorable things that Ryle has to say about Heidegger in this review. None of the good articles and translations of originally foreign articles into English on Heidegger that appear in Philosophy Today are to be found. Helene Weiss' "The Greek Conception of Time and Being in the Light of Heidegger's Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II, pp. 173-187 does not appear, although an article on Heidegger in the previous issue of the same journal does. There is no index of topics but only of authors. Building on H. Lübbe's twelve-year old bibliography this work is of great service to Heideggerians.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Fr. James Demske first published this book in 1963 in Germany under the title: Sein, Mensch und Tod: Das Todesproblem bei Martin Heidegger. Except for minor revisions--such as changing the numeration and headings of the chapters and the occasional expansion of paragraphs--this is substantially the same book. The author follows the development of the problem of death in Heidegger through the famous discussion in Being and Time and into the later works. The fact of the continuing importance of "death" in (...) Heidegger's work is easily overlooked. But while the phrase "Being-unto-death" disappears after Being and Time the same phenomenon of Dasein's mortality reappears in the later accounts of the "Quadrate" : the heavens and earth, gods, and mortals. Chapter six of Demske's book is one of the few and clearest accounts of this central theme in Heidegger's thought. The book as a whole, apart from its thematization of the problem of death, presents a sound appraisal and a clear overview of the development of Heidegger's "path of thought" and is, on that account too, a welcome addition to the literature.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Kostos Axelos, Greek-born Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne and author of a trilogy in French, Le Déploiement de l'errance, and of several French translations of Lucás and Heidegger, attempts an important confrontation of the two thinkers whom many regard as the major thinkers in European thought today: Marx and Heidegger. To some this is a confrontation of the left and the right, but Axelos moves in an entirely different range altogether. Heidegger himself remarks that a confrontation with Marx must (...) be made in terms of the problem of history. Both Heidegger and Marx--to some extent as the heirs of Hegel--are philosophers of the future. Axelos' book is written from the Heideggerian standpoint, centering on Heidegger's interpretation of the present age in terms of Technik, which is itself a movement in the mission of Being. The movements of the Geschick, as Heidegger says in Der Satz vom Grund and as Axelos emphasizes, are a world-play. The task of a thinking concerned with the future is to play along with the play. The future in Marxist and Heideggerian terms is a "planetary" age, beyond all nationalism, ruled by a global or planetary technology. Thinking must decide whether and how such technology will be an instrument of liberation or of oppression. Axelos' confrontation raises many central and interesting questions: what is the relationship between Heidegger's Gelassenheit and Marx's praxis? What hope is there for a future governed by a play? etc. The book can be recommended as both original and provocative.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Otto Pöggeler is among the most distinguished living German scholars. He is the coeditor of the new critical edition of the works of Hegel published by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. In addition he is the author of what many regard as the book on Heidegger. He has access to documents that Heidegger makes available to only a few and is considered to have an acquaintance with the pre-Sein und Zeit period that is matched by none. This latest volume--a collection of important (...) articles that have appeared in European periodicals on Heidegger, and offered on the occasion of his 80th birthday--is exactly what one would expect of Pöggeler. The contributions are most distinguished. To name a few: Löwith on Heidegger and Protestant theology; Schulz's famous article on the place of Heidegger in the history of Philosophy; Gadamer on Heidegger and Marburg theology; Beda Allemann on Heidegger's engagement with the National Socialists; Tugendhat on Heidegger's idea of truth; and finally an article by Pöggeler on Heidegger's hermeneutics. Pöggeler also provides a 38-page introduction entitled "Heidegger Today." In addition to a helpful index, there is a tripartite bibliography including not only Heidegger's works and the important secondary literature but also the works of independent thinkers who think out of the context and under the influence of Heidegger--such as Binswanger, Bultmann, Fink, Löwith et al.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Josiah Thompson, who has authored a previous work on Kierkegaard in 1967 and just recently edited Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, has, with the present title, made a memorable contribution to Kierkegaardian literature. Kierkegaard may be best described as a philosophical-biographical essay. It studies the development of Kierkegaard’s life from his birth in 1813 to his burial in 1855 in a funeral which results in a "near riot" at the graveside. Thompson has produced a continuous, compelling narrative which is (...) vividly and often beautifully written. There are no footnotes to interrupt the almost novel-like quality of the prose, which often includes even bits of dialogue. Yet, at the end of the 238 pages of prose, there are 37 pages of notes, referring back to page and line, which richly document the facts, scenes, and often the conversation which Thompson has presented. In Chapter 12, "Master of Irony," in the most philosophically important discussion in the book, Thompson develops his thesis that the aim of the pseudonymous writings is to portray "the necessary failure of all human projects". There is a shattering discussion of Kierkegaard’s final reflections on Christianity in the next to the last chapter. In all, Thompson has written a superb and penetrating study of Kierkegaard.—J.D.C. (shrink)

With the publication of this translation the quality of Heidegger literature available in English takes a quantum leap forward. No book--save perhaps Otto Poeggeler's--can match Marx's for its depth of insight into Heidegger's thought. The central theme of the book is as follows. Hegel's claim to have consummated the Western "tradition" is accepted by Heidegger. The foundations of this tradition are in Greek ontology. Marx locates the classic formulation of the basic tenets of Greek ontology in the Aristotelian doctrine of (...) ousia. Being as ousia is the perduring, necessary and intelligible. The Hegelian idea of Being remains within the Aristotelian perspective because it determines Being as the unfolding of the self-same substance according to necessary law and so as to develop into a stage of maximum intelligibility. Being is more radically temporal, of course, for Hegel but this stays within the perspective of the Greek notion of eternity, because the Hegelian "substance" is relentlessly working out an eternal pattern of categories which is inscribed in its very essence, and which the Logic articulates. Heidegger's philosophy seeks to "overcome" the "tradition," and so the whole metaphysics of "substance and subject." Being is even more radically temporalized, for Heidegger does not think time on the "model" of eternity. Being as time is not the movement of the self-same through time but time itself--as Being. The necessity and lawfulness of Being, moreover, is replaced by the "play" of the "fourfold." And the radical intelligibility of Being is overcome in Heidegger's thought by the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. Finally, against the Aristotelian-Hegelian teleology Heidegger posits the hope of a "new beginning" of history whose coming to pass--by a "turn" on Being's part--can only be obscurely intimated and at best "awaited." Not the least among this book's merits is the refreshingly critical attitude of the author to Heidegger--the book he says was prompted by a reflection on Heidegger-critic Lowith's [[sic]] work on Heidegger. His criticism of Heidegger in the conclusion of this book sets out important objections which the usual commentator ignores or evades or attributes to a "fallenness" into "calculative" thinking.--J. D. C. (shrink)

After Being and Time itself, A Letter on Humanism is perhaps Heidegger’s most important work. It is a comparatively clear statement of the "later Heidegger" which focuses on the possibility of a "humanism" and the meaning of "ethics" for the thinking-committed-to-being. It is also Heidegger’s own retrieval of Being and Time twenty years later, giving a decisive self-interpretation of the main lines of this so-called "early work." Cousineau aims at providing the reader with a "handy, scholarly tool" for interpreting the (...) Letter. He does this in three ways. 1) He provides a running commentary on selected but important passages from the Letter, with a generous use of the original German followed by a translation or paraphrase. 2) He takes a great deal of pain with Heidegger’s German and does not hesitate to call the only currently available translation of the Letter in English "deplorable", a judgment this translation frequently merits. 3) Finally, he presents us with an extensive annotated bibliography of works in seven languages which has the unusual feature of being coded by the letters A, B, and C which he defines as follows: anti-humanism, i.e., the interpretation of the relation between Being and Dasein advanced by the author sees Heidegger as devaluing man’s essence; metahumanism, the relationship is seen as unrealistic and mythical, and man’s essence is absent; authentic humanism, the interpretor [[sic]] sees in Heidegger’s view a representation of man’s true possibility for being human. Cousineau wisely reserves a category "D" for those whose position does not accommodate itself to these classifications. There are 95 entries in this bibliography which ranges over most of the important literature.—J.D.C. (shrink)

The author, a professor of psychiatry and religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, is interested in developing a religious consciousness which is in many ways opposed to that of the existentialists, at least the more anguished existentialists. "Many contemporary Christians appear to be taking the advice of the Apostle Paul to 'work out your salvation with fear and trembling' out of context." And again: "Modern man's nibbling on intellectual fodder and breathing of 'existential' complaints has led him far (...) astray from his true destiny and rendered him a caricature of his true nature." Play is neither deadly serious nor mere fun, but these are the only alternatives of which modern man is aware. Modern man has forgotten the unique character of play and since this belongs to the essence of religion and liturgy, he has forgotten the essence of Christianity. True religion is playful. And the age of leisure has the time to cultivate play if it would set about doing so. In the course of his argument the author surveys the views of Freud, Erikson, Brown, Eliade, Otto, Huizinga, and Callois.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Edited by the author of The Lonely Labyrinth, this anthology is a superb collection of Kierkegaard studies. It begins with two general statements of Kierkegaard’s thought: Louis Mackey’s previously published and tightly packed essay "The Poetry of Inwardness," and a chapter from Prof. Thompson’s newest book on Kierkegaard entitled "The Master of Irony." There is also Sartre’s essay "The Singular Universal" from Kierkegaard Vivant and an interesting historical essay by Richard Popkin which situates Kierkegaard in the history of modern skepticism (...) and shows his affinities with Hume. If there is a common theme to this collection it is the notion that Kierkegaard has persistently separated himself from the statements of his pseudonymous authors and that what has come to be known as "Kierkegaard’s philosophy" is really the product of Kierkegaard’s irony. Otherwise Kierkegaard’s entire literary effort becomes self-contradictory. The essays by Thompson, Crites and Allison are especially relevant in this regard. Editor Thompson has also done us the splendid service of updating the 1962 Kierkegaard Bibliografi with a supplement which includes all the literature in English for the years 1956-70. There is also a most helpful index locurum of the works of Kierkegaard cited in this anthology.—J.D.C. (shrink)

Strange as it may seem, this volume is the first booklength study of Jaspers in English And it is certainly very welcome and long overdue. The author studied under Jaspers in 1934-1935 at Heidelberg. After a brief biography he clarifies a number of issues which always arise and frequently obfuscate discussions of existential philosophers--such as the problems of demonstration and of clarity. Wallraff then treats in turn: philosophy and science, Jaspers' theory of society and its institutions; the existential themes of (...) freedom, communication, and ultimate situations. The following chapters concern Jaspers' metaphysical views: transcendence, cipher-reading, and the encompassing. Wallraff is thus plainly following the outline of Jaspers' thought which is provided by Jaspers' own magnum opus, Philosophy: I. World-Orientation; II. Existenz-illumination; III. Metaphysics. The treatment is always clear and sympathetic. The author avoids any sustained criticism of Jaspers; nor does he conduct any investigation of the once much discussed relationship between Jaspers and Heidegger. The author also provides his readers with a helpful bibliography of Jasper's works and their English translations.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This interesting volume approaches Heidegger in a fresh and suggestive way. The author views Heidegger's thought as a confrontation with the history of metaphysics, an assumption which can hardly be contested. After a preliminary characterization of the essence of "metaphysics" as the later Heidegger understands that word, Laffoucreière reconstructs, chronologically, the history of metaphysics as Heidegger conceives it, studying in turn Heidegger's interpretation of: Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Nietzsche. She approaches Heidegger's thought through the eyes (...) of his Nietzsche-interpretation. Heidegger sees the history of the west in profoundly Nietzschean tones: it is the history of nihilism and of the domination of western thought by Christian-Platonic metaphysics whose pivotal concept, God as the first cause, has deteriorated to the point of meaninglessness. The times are needy and it is only by a new turn, a new sending of Being as Mission, that nihilism can be overcome. Laffoucreière explains clearly and forcefully that Heidegger's Seinsdenken is not atheistic, except in the sense of the theos of western metaphysics. She shows that a major concern of Heidegger's thought is to overcome the God of metaphysics in favor of the divine God to whom man can bend his knee. She argues that Heidegger's attempt to retrieve the original sense of Being and man, far from being atheistic, aims in fact at making possible a renewed sense of the living God. The interpretation is sound and for those who doubt it there is a three sentence endorsement of the work by Heidegger himself in which he welcomes the publication of "a clear and pertinent exposition of my thought."--J. D. C. (shrink)

M. Palmier has made a valuable contribution to one of the most controversial issues in contemporary philosophy: the problem of Heidegger and the Nazis. Palmier does not side-step the issue by writing off the political works of 1933-1934 as a regrettable "mistake." "These writings belong to the work of Heidegger as the theological works at Tübingen belong to that of Hegel". He analyzes what is known of Heidegger's early life in a somewhat sketchy way, omitting, e.g., any mention of Karl (...) Braig. After discussing Brentano, Rickert, Lask, and Dilthey, he studies Heidegger's relationship with Cassirer and clears up most convincingly the charge of anti-Semitism levelled against Heidegger in 1950 by Cassirer's wife. This is followed by an equally persuasive and sympathetic account of Heidegger and Husserl. The heart of the book, however, is an analysis of the remark made in 1935 in which Heidegger refers to the "inner truth and grandeur" of the Nazi movement which became so notorious when Heidegger allowed it to appear unchanged in the 1953 edition of those lectures under the title An Introduction to Metaphysics. The grandeur Heidegger has in mind is the confrontation of modern man and planetary technology. This phrase must be understood, Palmier argues, in connection with a book by Ernst Jünger which appeared in 1932 entitled Der Arbeiter. The analysis the author offers is most illuminating. Palmier's interpretation is happily reenforced by an appendix which consists in a selection of texts from Ernst Krieck, an official Party philosopher, in which Heidegger is violently attacked--thus making the distance which Heidegger had put between himself and the Nazis abundantly clear, and effectively counterbalancing Schneeberger's one-sided documentation in Nachlese zu Heidegger.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This volume is No. 86 in a series entitled "Initiation philosophique," directed by Jean Lacroix. Henriot takes issue with those who, on the one hand, hold that all is play and with those who, on the other hand, hold that because everything is determined, there is nothing arbitrary or undetermined, and consequently there is no play at all. The author's argument occurs in three stages: the structure of play as an objective fact ; the act of playing itself ; that (...) which makes play to be play. This last element the author identifies as the "intersubjective" or "existential." This constitutes the three parts of the book: I. Games; II. Playing; III. The Player.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This book is a valuable contribution to the growing list of works appearing in English on Heidegger. Its special merit lies in the fact that its author brings to his discussion of Heidegger a familiarity with Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The author explains Sein und Zeit in a language with which any student of analysis would be comfortable. By way of example, Schmitt refers to Heidegger's idea of fundamental ontology by noting "a reform of talk about being involves a reform of (...) talk about human beings." The book does not attempt to recap all of Sein und Zeit but provides the reader who approaches that work for the first time with the basic concepts needed. The author's basic claim is that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger is making new "conceptual recommendations" for our understanding of man and the world. This represents, Schmitt argues, a break with his earlier, pre-Sein und Zeit and Husserlian conviction of the existence of an a priori and ideal language and its "objective meanings." The whole discussion of Sein und Zeit's idea of language is more original and illuminating than anything yet to appear in English. As the title of the work indicates, the author regards Heidegger's main contribution to lie in the theory of man, and he sees the celebrated "turn" as testimony to the failure of Sein und Zeit to provide a new way of speaking about being. But even as a theory of man, Schmitt warns, Sein und Zeit is blind to the social and the communal. Schmitt's book is a challenging and illuminating introduction of Sein und Zeit for the American reader and one which no Heideggerian can afford to miss.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Mohanty’s work is a collection of essays whose range of interest is quite astounding: phenomenology, analytic philosophy and Indian thought. Part One is concerned with the problem of the given, a problem of great interest to both analytic and phenomenological philosophy, and argues against a theory of raw, uninterpreted sense data. The title of the book is drawn from one of the essays contained in this part, which makes a plea for a non-speculative, descriptive ontology of the given. Part Two (...) offers a series of critical essays on the work of Quine, Goodman, Ryle and Moore on the one hand, and Husserl and Hartmann on the other. The last part is devoted to a study of the Indian "Nyaya" philosophy, and shows its relevance to the epistemological issues that Mohanty has raised throughout this volume. Perhaps the major interest of this book is the striking unity the author finds among these diverse philosophical strains.—J. D. C. (shrink)

Like his earlier study The Phenomenological Movement, Spiegelberg’s latest work is a comprehensive overview—not of the phenomenological movement itself —but of its influence on psychology and psychiatry. Its aim is to show that the presence of phenomenology in these disciplines has broadened the perspectives of these empirical sciences and has loosened the death-grip that positivism and naturalism, behaviorism and atomistic associationism, might otherwise have exerted upon them, Spiegelberg does this "concretely" by a wide ranging account of philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists (...) which testifies again to his great erudition and incomparable familiarity with phenomenological literature. The index of authors studied covers six pages of double columns. Part One gives a "general orientation" to the field, discussing first the notion of phenomenological psychology and then the presence of phenomenology in psychology, in psychopathology and psychiatry, in psychoanalysis and in American psychology. The second half of the book is devoted to more concentrated studies of "leading figures" and devotes entire chapters to such thinkers as Jaspers, Binswagner, Minkowski, Buytendijk and Frankl. The American student of phenomenology is once again the beneficiary of Spiegelberg’s conscientious and incisive scholarship the beneficiary of Spiegelberg’s conscientious and incisive scholarship.—J. D. C. (shrink)

A clear restatement of the essentials of the Maritain approach to Christian Wisdom, the work is concerned with the nature and hierarchy of the kinds of knowledge. This hierarchizing is accomplished from that standpoint of the philosophizing Christian in which the scientific is subordinated to the philosophic and especially the metaphysical, and in which the human is subordinate to the theological and especially mystical. In such a world view the ultimate value term is the contemplative, and the possibility and actuality (...) of a "Christian Humanism" is affirmed through a relating of natural human knowledge and divine contemplation. The Christian philosopher is a finite intelligence confronting "Being" which is ultimately trans-conceptualizable and so mysterious; but God is Being Itself and so the finite intelligence tends toward God by a native and internal dynamism. The author is not concerned with the esthetico-epistemological reflections of Maritain but does carefully analyze knowledge through affective connaturality. He also attempts to develop a closer relation between a metaphysical "philosophy of nature" and modern science, construed as a mathematical interpretation and organization of phenomena, in his concept of "integrated knowledge of nature." Unfortunately there is a striking disaffection for dissenting philosophical views. In defending Thomism against its critics the author not only says that the critics do not understand it, but he also suggests that this is because its opponents, when they are sceptics and agnostics, lack Grace and so are deprived of a purely natural intellectual strength which accompanies its presence and are therefore intellectually defective. Such narrowness is offensive, not necessary to the author's thesis, and seems opposed to the spirit of Aquinas himself.—J. D. C. (shrink)

The present volume is one of the few recent works to devote its attention to the "early" Heidegger, yet it contributes significantly to our understanding of Heidegger's later development. "Transcendence" means crossing beyond the being to the horizon within which the being appears. The "transcendental" make-up of Dasein, which is the power of Dasein to make this crossing, is the principal theme of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Vom Wesen des Grundes. "Difference" is the "ontological difference" between Being (...) and beings which is discussed again in Vom Wesen des Grundes and--since Being is not-any-being--in the analysis of the Nothing in Was ist Metaphysik? The pivotal element in Rosales' interpretation is the radical finitude of Dasein's "transcendence." For transcendental-horizonal thinking is unequipped to explain the radical concealment of Being which Dasein experiences. While providing the horizon within which things appear, transcendental-horizonal thinking does not offer an explanation for the recalcitrant hiddenness of Being. Hence Being must be experienced as a-letheia, as the original, independent process of concealing itself, and of revealing itself. And a break with the early transcendental-horizonal or Kantian, and so "subjectivistic" or "metaphysical" perspective of Sein und Zeit is necessitated. While the author owes a clear debt to Marx and Schulz, his interpretation is impressive and a contribution.--J. D. C. (shrink)

In this volume, the author is concerned with working out one of the most fundamental themes in Heidegger’s thought, the "difference" between Being and that-which-is. The expression "ontological difference" is found neither in Being and Time nor Heidegger’s later works, where the term "ontological" is abandoned; nonetheless, what the term signified when it was used—the distinction itself—is central to all of Heidegger’s writings. Vail has written a careful analysis of the role this distinction plays in Heidegger’s later writings, examining it (...) from a multiplicity of perspectives. After discussing the way in which this distinction is opened up by Being itself, viz., by Being’s withdrawal in the very process of revealing itself in beings, Vail then analyzes the relation of this distinction to human thinking, to the "destiny" which lies behind the history of metaphysics, to the Region and, finally, to language. (shrink)

Eckhartian studies in English have recently taken a large step forward. In addition to the present volume, two other books and a special issue of The Thomist have since 1977 been devoted to the Rhineland mystic who for so long lay in oblivion. Schürmann’s study first appeared in French in 1972. It is here translated by the author himself, who now teaches at the New School. Schürmann’s format in each of the three chapters is to offer a translation of a (...) key sermon of the Meister, and then to weave the main themes of his teachings in a detailed analysis and commentary upon each sermon. At the end of each chapter, and sometimes within it, five other sermons which treat of a cognate theme are also translated. The translations alone are quite welcome in view of the scarcity of good English renderings of Meister Eckhart. And Schürmann’s commentary is extremely valuable as well. The American edition follows the French edition quite closely. Schürmann has added a short conclusion to the third chapter, excerpted from a previous article. And he has added an additional sermon, "Blessed are the Poor," at the end of the book. This is a happy choice, for the sermon in question is to my mind Eckhart’s greatest, and it serves as an excellent transition to the appendix, which is also new in the American edition, and treats of the Eckhart interpretation proposed by Suzuki in Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist. The subtitle of the book has also been changed; the French read "la joie errante," the wandering joy. (shrink)

The author laudably attempts to integrate Cassirer's approach to symbolism with current work being done by sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists. The thesis that symbols are the creative link between personality and culture is defended in a variety of ways. The discussion is repetitious and disorganized. Still, the rich array of content deserves attention.--D. C. B.

The first and longer of the two books in this volume interprets some doctrines of "the levels of Being," ontological knowledge and evil: those of Plato, Plotinus, Jewish mysticism, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, D. H. Lawrence and Bergson. Mme. Amado's purpose is to present the basic intuition and vision of each position, rather than an articulation of the theses. She shows that an identical intuition underlies the greatly differing theories. With some justifiable oversimplification, we might call this an historical epistemology. In Book (...) Two, Mme. Amado shows that knowledge grows from the surmounted experience of evil, and that evil is an ontological category. Being itself is historical. Knowledge, being, evil and history are brought together in an explication of "the desire to know." Evil is discussed principally in terms of exile and alienation--to seek knowledge is to overcome diremption; it is to seek the One. In this light, the history of Israel is examined at some length. An astute student of both Marx and Freud, the author manages to be faithful to them even in speculative philosophy. The book is forbidding in length and locution, but it justifies Mme. Amado's reputation as one of the more important philosophers in Europe today.--C. D. (shrink)

Eva Brann writes engagingly on a topic that too frequently is swollen with "flaccid edification" or tired and abstract jargon, whose mere familiarity to the reader elicits his nod. The author early gives notice of her disdain for this conventional rightmindedness: "I defy anyone to produce a present-day effusion on education that does not mean to further students’ creativity; for example, picked utterly at random out of a collection: ‘To create... is the uniquely human attribute'. Now, I would have thought (...) that that was what it was precisely not, and that to become a creator a student should not go to school but to heaven. Similarly with values; it is de rigueur to demand that a ’sense of values’ be instilled. It seems to bother few people that the subversive term value was given currency by Nietzsche to devalue our instilled beliefs and our received morality, so that nothing might be good in itself, but only as someone valued it". Brann also has some harsh words for the urge to restructure society, the encouragement of self-expression, and the project of making students think for themselves. According to Brann, the primary requisite of the teacher’s character should be a "certain proud shamelessness. But it does not become more vivid with more words". Instead, I would suggest that her book exhibits it in deed. (shrink)

This book attacks an assortment of tendencies and assumptions that the author believes endemic to traditional epistemology. Perhaps the main target is what she sees as a tendency to sublimate the concepts of knowledge and belief, whose roles in everyday life are mundane and unsystematic, into rigid abstractions. This tendency is said to show itself in the allegedly false assumptions that propositions are the objects of knowledge and belief, and that there is a definite set of propositions that one knows (...) and another that one believes. One or the other of these assumptions is said to underlie Chisholm’s attempt to state necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, Prichard’s to distinguish knowledge from belief, Malcolm’s to distinguish a ’strong’ from a ‘weak’ sense of ‘to know’, Moore’s to rebut skepticism by giving examples of things he knows, and Descartes’ to imagine that all his beliefs are false. All make the mistake, Wolgast thinks, of speaking of knowledge or belief in the abstract, without reference to the actual use of language. In particular, Chisholm, Prichard, and Moore fail to realize that the force of ‘I know’ varies from context to context. (shrink)

Ethical guidance for genomic research is increasingly sought and perceived to be necessary. Although there are pressing ethical issues in genomic research – concerning for example the recruitment of patients/participants; the process of taking consent; data sharing; and returning results to patients/participants – there is still limited useful guidance available for researchers/clinicians or for the research ethics committees who review such projects. This report outlines the ethical principles and guidance for genomic research co-produced with stakeholders during two workshops which (...) took place in the UK between November 2016 and May 2017. The stakeholders involved in these workshops included: healthcare professionals, genomic research teams, academics, patients, biobank managers, and representatives from the Health Research Authority, NHS Research Ethics Committees, patient support groups, pharmaceutical industry, and health policy think tanks. The co-produced principles and guidance are specifical... (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

Institutional review board delays may hinder the successful completion of federally funded research in the U.S. military. When this happens, time-sensitive, mission-relevant questions go unanswered. Research participants face unnecessary burdens and risks if delays squeeze recruitment timelines, resulting in inadequate sample sizes for definitive analyses. More broadly, military members are exposed to untested or undertested interventions, implemented by well-intentioned leaders who bypass the research process altogether. To illustrate, we offer two case examples. We posit that IRB delays often appear (...) in the service of managing institutional risk, rather than protecting research participants. Regulators may see more risk associated with moving quickly than risk related to delay, choosing to err on the side of bureaucracy. The authors of this article, all of whom are military-funded researchers, government stakeholders, and/or human subject protection experts, offer feasible recommendations to improv... (shrink)

Author's reply to De Caro's, Lavazza's, Lemos', and Pereboom's comments on D.C. Dennett, Reflection on Sam Harris' "Free Will".